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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/751,088	12/29/2000	Douglas E. Love	7000-051	5020

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WITHROW & TERRANOVA, P.L.L.C.
P.O. BOX 1287
CARY, NC 27512

EXAMINER


BORISSOV, IGOR N

ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER

3629

DATE MAILED: 11/17/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary	Application No.	Applicant(s)	
	09/751,088	LOVE ET AL.	
	Examiner	Art Unit	
	Igor Borissov	3629	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 03 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 19 August 2004.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) See Continuation Sheet is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-3,5,7-11,13,15,16,18-20,22,24-28,30,32,33,35-37,39,41-45,47,49,50 and 54-56 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152) |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

Continuation of Disposition of Claims: Claims pending in the application are 1-3,5,7-11,13,15,16,18-20,22,24-28,30,32,33,35 37,39,41-45,47,49,50 and 54-56.

DETAILED ACTION

Response to Amendment

Amendment received on 8/19/2004 is acknowledged and entered. **Claims 4, 6, 12, 14, 17, 21, 23, 29, 31, 34, 38, 46, 48 and 51-53** have been canceled. **Claims 1, 22, 49, 50** have been amended. **Claims 1-3, 5, 7-11, 13, 15-16, 18-20, 22, 24-28, 30, 32-33, 35-37, 39-45, 47, 49-50 and 54-56** are currently pending in the application.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 18-20, 22, 24-28, 30, 32-33 and 55 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. The specification does not provide a description of the system for sharing costs associated with toll calls in such a way to enable a person skilled in the art to which it pertains to reconstruct and practice the invention.

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 18-20, 22, 24-28, 30, 32-33 and 55 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being incomplete for omitting essential elements, such omission amounting to a gap between the elements. See MPEP § 2172.01. The claimed system is missing any structural elements, which would provide functionality of the system.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Claims 1, 3-8, 17, 19-20 and 27-37 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed method for operating self-service terminal does not recite a limitation in the technological arts.

As an initial matter, the United States Constitution under Art. I, §8, cl. 8 gave Congress the power to "[p]romote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries". In carrying out this power, Congress authorized under 35 U.S.C. §101 a grant of a patent to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition or matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." Therefore, a fundamental premise is that a patent is a statutorily created vehicle for Congress to confer an exclusive right to the inventors for "inventions" that promote the progress of "science and the useful arts". The phrase "technological arts" has been created and used by the courts to offer another view of the term "useful arts". See *In re Musgrave*, 167 USPQ (BNA) 280 (CCPA 1970). See also MPEP 2106 II A which states that only when the claim is devoid of any limitation to a practical application "in the technological arts" should it be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101. Hence, the first test of whether an invention is eligible for a patent is to determine if the invention is within the "technological arts".

Further, despite the express language of §101, several judicially created exceptions have been established to exclude certain subject matter as being patentable subject matter covered by §101. These exceptions include "laws of nature", "natural phenomena", and "abstract ideas". See *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450, U.S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ (BNA) 1, 7 (1981). However, courts have found that even if an invention incorporates abstract ideas, such as mathematical algorithms, the invention may

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nevertheless be statutory subject matter if the invention as a whole produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result." See *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.* 149 F.3d 1368, 1973, 47 USPQ2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The "two prong" test was evident when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) decided an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See *In re Toma*, 197 USPQ (BNA) 852 (CCPA 1978). In *Toma*, the court held that the recited mathematical algorithm did not render the claim as a whole non-statutory using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test as applied to *Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ (BNA) 673 (1972). Additionally, the court decided separately on the issue of the "technological arts". The court developed a "technological arts" analysis:

The "technological" or "useful" arts inquiry must focus on whether the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the product of the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the prior art which the claimed subject matter purports to replace...is statutory, and not on whether the claimed subject matter is presently perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g., whether it "enhances" the operation of a machine. In re Toma at 857.

In *Toma*, the claimed invention was a computer program for translating a source human language (e.g., Russian) into a target human language (e.g., English). The court found that the claimed computer implemented process was within the "technological art" because the claimed invention was an operation being performed by a computer within a computer.

The decision in *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.* never addressed this prong of the test. In *State Street Bank & Trust Co.*, the court found that the "mathematical exception" using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, application to determining the presence of statutory subject matter but rather, statutory subject matter should be based on whether the operation produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result". See *State Street Bank & Trust Co.* at 1374. Furthermore, the court found that there was no "business method exception" since the court decisions

that purported to create such exceptions were based on novelty or lack of enablement issues and not on statutory grounds. Therefore, the court held that "[w]hether the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be judged under §101, but rather under §§102, 103 and 112." See *State Street Bank & Trust Co.* at 1377. Both of these analysis goes towards whether the claimed invention is non-statutory because of the presence of an abstract idea. Indeed, *State Street* abolished the Freeman-Walter-Abele test used in *Toma*. However, *State Street* never addressed the second part of the analysis, i.e., the "technological arts" test established in *Toma* because the invention in *State Street* (i.e., a computerized system for determining the year-end income, expense, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio) was already determined to be within the technological arts under the *Toma* test.

In the decision of *AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc.*, 50 USPQ2d 1447, 1449-50 (Fed. Cir. 1999), it was recognized that not everything is statutory subject matter. The court noted that a mathematical algorithm or abstract idea is directed to non-statutory subject matter unless applied in a useful way or otherwise reduced to some type of practical application. The analysis in the *AT&T Corp* decision focused on whether or not the claimed mathematical algorithm was used to produce a useful, concrete and tangible result. AT&T's claimed process employs subscribers' and call recipients' primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator as data, applies Boolean algebra to those data to determine the value of the PIC indicator, and applies that value through switching and recording mechanisms to create a signal useful for billing purposes. The court noted that PIC indicator represents information about the call recipient's PIC, a useful, non-abstract result that facilitates differential billing of long-distance calls made by an IXC's subscriber, and therefore, found the claimed process to comfortably fall within the scope of Section 101. *AT&T Corp.*, 50 USPQ2d 1453. Again, *AT&T Corp.* never addressed the second part of the analysis, i.e., the "technological arts" test established in *Toma* because the court in *AT&T Corp.* recognized that the claims require the use of switches and computers. In *AT&T Corp.*, the decisions of *In re Alappat*, 33 F.3d 1526, 31 USPQ2d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and *Arrhythmia Research Tech. Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.*, 958 F.2d 1053, 1060, 22 USPQ2d 1033,1039 (Fed. Cir.

1992) were also cited. In *Alappat* it was held that more than an abstract idea was claimed because the claimed invention as a whole was directed toward forming a specific machine that produced the useful, concrete and tangible result of a smooth waveform display. In *Alappat*, the claimed invention was for a machine that achieved certain results and was therefore, already considered to involve the technological arts. In *Arrhythmia*, the court reasoned that the method claims qualified as statutory subject matter by noting that the steps transformed physical, electrical signals from one form into another form – a number representing a signal related to the patient's heart activity, a non-abstract output.

This dichotomy has been recently acknowledged by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) in affirming a §101 rejection finding the claimed invention to be non-statutory. See *Ex parte Bowman*, 61 USPQ2d (BNA) 1669 (BdPatApp&Int 2001).

The claims of the present application are distinguished from the claims analyzed in the decisions of *State Street*, *Alappat*, *Arrhythmia* and *AT&T*, where the claims in these cases clearly involved the use of technology as shown below.

State Street: The claims were in means plus function form and directed to a data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership; the claims included limitations of a computer processor means for processing data, a storage means for storing data on a storage medium along with first through fifth means for processing different types of financial data. As such, the claims analyzed in *State Street* clearly involved the technological arts and, therefore, whether or not the claimed invention involved the technological arts was not an issue.

AT&T Corp: The claims were directed to a method for use in a telecommunications system in which interexchange calls initiated by each subscriber are automatically routed over the facilities of a particular one of a plurality of interexchange carriers associated with that subscriber comprising generating a message record for an interexchange call between an originating subscriber and a terminating subscriber, and including, in said message record, a primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value which is a function of whether or not the

interexchange carrier associated with said terminating subscriber is a predetermined one of said interexchange carriers. In considering these claims, it is clear that technology is being used to "automatically route" calls over the facilities of interexchange carriers and generating a message record for the call. Furthermore, the courts, in analyzing these claims, clearly indicated that they recognized the claims require the use of switches and computers. See *AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc.*, 50 USPQ2d at 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court further noted that AT&T's claimed process employs subscriber's and call recipients' PICs as data, applies Boolean algebra to those data to determine the value of the PIC indicator, and applies that value through *switching and recording mechanisms* to create a signal useful for billing purposes. See *AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc.*, 50 USPQ2d at 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1999). As such, the claims analyzed in AT&T clearly involved the technological arts as recognized by the court and, therefore, whether or not the claimed invention involved the technological arts was not an issue.

Alappat: The claims were directed to a rasterizer for converting vector list data representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means comprising various means for determining distances and means for outputting illumination intensity data. Alappat's invention related generally to a means for creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope and as indicated by the court, Alappat's invention is an improvement in an oscilloscope comparable to a TV having a clearer picture. The court reasoned that invention was statutory because the claimed invention was directed to a "machine". See *In re Alappat*, 31 USPQ2d at 1552-54 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Furthermore, in the decision of *AT&T Corp.*, the courts recognized that the claims in Alappat were for a machine that achieved certain results. See *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.* 50 USPQ2d at 1452 (CAFC 1999). Once again, these claims clearly involve the technological arts as recognized by the court and, therefore, whether or not the claimed invention involved the technological arts was not an issue.

Arrhythmia: The claims were directed to a method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the presence or absence of a predetermined

level of high frequency energy in the late QRS signal including the step of converting a series of QRS signals to time segments, each segment having a digital value equivalent to the analog value of said signals at said time. In considering these claims, it is clear that technology is being used to convert a series of QRS signals to time segments having a digital value. Once again, these claims clearly involve the technological arts since one could not convert a signal to a time segment having a digital value without the aid of a computer or some processing device and, therefore, whether or not the claimed invention involved the technological arts was not an issue.

Contrary to the claims in the above-cited cases, in the present application, the claims are completely silent with regard to technology and is purely an abstract idea or process steps that are employed completely without the use of any technology whatsoever. The claims are no more than a suggested idea of splitting expenses for toll calls between parties. The claims are completely devoid of any means to carry out a process implementing the idea of sharing costs of toll calls, and do not recite any limitations that would suggest a computer or data processing device is being used to carry out the processes.

Furthermore, in accordance with MPEP 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b) "Statutory Process Claims", not all processes are statutory under 35 U.S.C. 101. *Schrader*, 22 F.3d at 296, 30 USPQ2d at 1460. To be statutory, a claimed computer related process must either: (A) result in a physical transformation outside the computer for which a practical application in the technological arts is either disclosed in the specification or would have been known to a skilled artisan, or (B) be limited to a practical application within the technological arts. See *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. at 183-184, 209 USPQ at 6 (quoting *Cochrane v. Deener*, 94 U.S. 780, 787-788 (1877)). The claims in the present application do not appear to satisfy either of the two conditions listed above. First, the claims do not include limitations that would suggest a computer is being used to transform the data from one form to another that would place the invention in the technological arts. Second, disregarding the fact that there is no computer claimed that would physically transform the data, there does not appear to be any physical transformation of data (i.e. cost value). The claims merely recite *receiving... and*

accepting ... proposed toll sharing parameters; however, said parameters appear to be an arbitrary abstract thing and not a discrete value resulting from a calculation of these parameters by a computer or processor. Moreover, the value of said parameters appears to be arbitrarily set by some other means (possibly a human) and not a result of an algorithm performed by a computer or processor specifically calculating these parameters. The method step: *"receiving a request for toll sharing, the request originating in a telephony device"* may be understood as merely talking over the phone. However, the claimed invention must utilize technology in a non-trivial manner (Ex parte Bowman, 61 USPQ2d 1665, 1671 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 2001)). Although Bowman is not precedential, it has been cited for its analysis.

Thus, there neither appears to be any physical transformation of data from one form to another, which is based upon an algorithm or a calculation by a computer or processor, nor is there any technology claimed that would be used to transform the data.

As to technological arts recited in the preamble, mere recitation in the preamble (i.e., intended or field of use) a network system, or mere implication of employing a machine or article of manufacture to perform some or all of the recited steps does not confer statutory subject matter to an otherwise abstract idea unless there is positive recitation in the claim as a whole to breathe life and meaning into the preamble.

Because the independently claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea which does not recite a limitation in the technological arts, those claims and claims depending from them, are not permitted under 35 USC 101 as being related to non-statutory subject matter. However, in order to consider those claims in light of the prior art, examiner will assume that those claims recite statutorily permitted subject matter.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

Claims 1, 18 and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Kalmanek, Jr. et al. (US 6,577,718) (Kalmanek).

Kalmanek teaches a call forwarding method and system with split billing, including:

As per claims 1, 18 and 35, receiving a request for toll sharing, the request originating in a telephony device; receiving proposed toll-sharing parameters; initiating a toll call; informing a call recipient; receiving the indication of acceptance of the toll call (C. 11, L. 41-57); and apportioning the cost for the toll call (C. 2, L. 5-7).

As per claims 2 and 36, generating billing information for each call participants (C. 25, L. 25-34).

As per claims 3 and 37, see reasoning applied to claims 1 and 35.

As per claims 5 and 39, calculating calling parameters for a call recipient in accordance with predetermined function (C. 27, L. 53-55).

As per claims 7 and 41, calculating calling parameters for a call recipient in accordance with predetermined function (C. 27, L. 53-55). Information as to *wherein the toll sharing parameters are defined* ... is non-functional language and given no patentable weight. Non-functional descriptive material cannot render non-obvious an invention that would otherwise have been obvious. See: *In re Gulack* 703 F.2d 1381,

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1385, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983) *In re Dembiczak* 175 F.3d 994, 1000, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

As per claims 8 and 42, applying said toll sharing parameters within a defined period of time (C. 34, L. 9-13).

As per claims 9 and 43, applying said toll sharing parameters within a defined period of time (C. 34, L. 9-13). Information as to *time of day, day, week, month and year* is non-functional language and given no patentable weight. Non-functional descriptive material cannot render non-obvious an invention that would otherwise have been obvious. See: *In re Gulack* 703 F.2d 1381, 1385, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983) *In re Dembiczak* 175 F.3d 994, 1000, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

As per claims 10-11 and 44-45, toll sharing parameters are defined to apply to at least one portion of the toll call (C. 2, L. 5-7).

As per claims 13 and 47, facilitating interaction with the call originator (C. 12, L. 26-28).

As per claims 15 and 49, the request is a code dialed by the call originator (C. 13, L. 51-52).

As per claims 54 and 56, see reasoning applied to claims 1 and 35.

As per claims 19-20, 22, 24-28, 30, 32-33 and 55, see reasoning applied to claims 1 and 18. Claims Directed to an Apparatus must be distinguished from the prior art in terms of structure rather than function, *In re Danly* 263 F.2d 844, 847, 120 USPQ 582, 531 (CCPA 1959).

A claim containing a "recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus" if the prior art apparatus teaches all the structural limitations of the claim. *Ex parte Masham*, 2 USPQ2d 1657 (bd Pat. App. & Inter. 1987). Thus as described the limitations of the claims do not distinguish the claimed apparatus from the prior art.

Response to Arguments

Applicant's arguments filed 8/19/2004 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

Applicant argues that the method claims recites a telephony device in which the request is originated, thereby obviating claim rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101.

In response to the applicant's argument the examiner stipulates that using the telephony device to make a phone call constitutes trivial use of technology. However, the claimed invention must utilize technology in a non-trivial manner (Ex parte Bowman, 61 USPQ2d 1665, 1671 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 2001)). Although Bowman is not precedential, it has been cited for its analysis.

Except reciting the telephony device, the claims are an abstract idea or process steps that are employed completely without the use of any technology. The claims are no more than a suggested idea of splitting expenses for toll calls between parties. The claims are completely devoid of any means to carry out a process implementing the idea of sharing costs of toll calls, and do not recite any limitations that would suggest a computer or data processing device is being used to carry out the processes.

Furthermore, the claims do not include limitations that would suggest either a computer is being used to transform the data from one form to another that would place the invention in the technological arts; or there is no any physical transformation of data (i.e. cost value). The claims merely recite *receiving... and accepting ... proposed toll sharing parameters*; however, said parameters appear to be an arbitrary abstract thing and not a discrete value resulting from a calculation of these parameters by a computer or processor.

Therefore, because the independently claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea which does not recite a limitation in the technological arts, those claims and claims depending from them, are not permitted under 35 USC 101 as being related to non-statutory subject matter (See a discussion above).

Applicant argues that claim rejections under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph is improper.

In response to the applicant's argument it is noted that claims 18-20, 22, 24-28, 30, 32, 33 and 55 recite a control system adapted to perform certain functions. However, there is no structural element of this system is defined in the claims. It is not clear what structural elements should be employed to provide functionality of the system. Claims neither recite a data processing device (a computer, servers, gateways), no any data communication means (a network such as PSTN or the Internet, routers, modems, gate controllers, etc.). Therefore, claims 18-20, 22, 24-28, 30, 32-33 and 55 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being incomplete for omitting essential elements, such omission amounting to a gap between the elements. See MPEP § 2172.01.

In response to the applicant's argument that the prior art does not teach receiving a decision from the call recipient as to whether the toll sharing parameters are accepted, it is noted that Kalmanek teaches signaling to the call originating device that the called party has indicated acceptance for the call (C. 11, L. 55-57).

In response to the applicant's argument that claim 18 does not recite an intended purpose of the system, the examiner points out that the preamble of the claim, and functionality of the system recited in the body of the claim clearly indicate the intended purpose of the system.

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Conclusion

THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the **THREE-MONTH** shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than **SIX MONTHS** from the date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication should be directed to Igor Borissov at telephone number (703) 305-4649.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the Receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 872-9306.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's Supervisor, John Weiss, can be reached at (703) 308- 2702.

Any response to this action should be mailed to:

Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks

Washington D.C. 20231


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11/12/2004


JOHN G. WEISS
SUPERVISORY PATENT EXAMINER
TECHNOLOGY CENTER 3600